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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-155
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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CON-
SCIOUSNESS, INC., and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,
PETITIONERS v. WALTER LEE
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the second circuit
[June 26, 1992]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  In this case we consider whether an airport terminal
operated by a public authority is a public forum and
whether a regulation prohibiting solicitation in the interior
of an airport terminal violates the First Amendment.
  The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.
Petitioner International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. (ISKCON) is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose
members perform a ritual known as sankirtan.  The ritual
consists of -`going into public places, disseminating reli-
gious literature and soliciting funds to support the reli-
gion.'''  925 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA2 1991).  The primary
purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the movement.
Ibid.
  Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police
superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey and was charged with enforcing the regulation at
issue.  The Port Authority owns and operates three major
airports in the greater New York City area:  John F.
Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La Guardia
Airport (La Guardia), and Newark International Airport
(Newark).  The three airports collectively form one of the
world's busiest metropolitan airport complexes.  They serve
approximately 8% of this country's domestic airline market
and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market.  By
decade's end they are expected to serve at least 110 million
passengers annually.  Id., at 578.
  The airports are funded by user fees and operated to
make a regulated profit.  Id., at 581.  Most space at the
three airports is leased to commercial airlines, which bear
primary responsibility for the leasehold.  The Port Authori-
ty retains control over unleased portions, including La
Guardia's Central Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy's
International Arrivals Building, and Newark's North
Terminal Building (we refer to these areas collectively as
the -terminals-).  The terminals are generally accessible to
the general public and contain various commercial estab-
lishments such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, news-
stands, and stores of various types.  Id., at 578.  Virtually
all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related to air
travel.  These visitors principally include passengers, those
meeting or seeing off passengers, flight crews, and terminal
employees.  Ibid.
  The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding
within the terminals the repetitive solicitation of money or
distribution of literature.  The regulation states:
``1.  The following conduct is prohibited within the
interior areas of buildings or structures at an air
terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by
in a continuous or repetitive manner:
``(a)  The sale or distribution of any merchandise,
including but not limited to jewelry, food stuffs, can-
dles, flowers, badges and clothing.
``(b)  The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures,
pamphlets, books or any other printed or written
material.
``(c)  Solicitation and receipt of funds.''  Id., at 578-579.

  The regulation governs only the terminals; the Port
Authority permits solicitation and distribution on the
sidewalks outside the terminal buildings.  The regulation
effectively prohibits petitioner from performing sankirtan in
the terminals.  As a result, petitioner brought suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. 1983,
alleging that the regulation worked to deprive them of
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.  The
District Court analyzed the claim under the -traditional
public forum- doctrine.  It concluded that the terminals
were akin to public streets, 721 F. Supp. 572, 577 (SDNY
1989), the quintessential traditional public fora.  This
conclusion in turn meant that the Port Authority's terminal
regulation could be sustained only if it was narrowly
tailored to support a compelling state interest.  Id., at 579.
In the absence of any argument that the blanket prohibition
constituted such narrow tailoring, the District Court
granted petitioner summary judgment.  Ibid.
  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part.  925 F. 2d 576 (1991).  Relying on our recent decision
in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. ___ (1990), a divided
panel concluded that the terminals are not public fora.  As
a result, the restrictions were required only to satisfy a
standard of reasonableness.  The Court of Appeals then
concluded that, presented with the issue, this Court would
find that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the
ban on distribution was not.  Petitioner sought certiorari
respecting the Court of Appeals' decision that the terminals
are not public fora and upholding the solicitation ban.
Respondent cross-petitioned respecting the court's holding
striking down the distribution ban.  We granted both
petitions, 502 U. S. ___ (1992), to resolve whether airport
terminals are public fora, a question on which the Circuits
have split and on which we once before granted certiorari
but ultimately failed to reach.  Board of Airport Comm'rs of
Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987).
  It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case
is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment.
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Kokinda, supra, at ___ (citing
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S.
620, 629 (1980)); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 788-789 (1988).  But it is also
well settled that the government need not permit all forms
of speech on property that it owns and controls.  United
States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns.,
453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828
(1976).  Where the government is acting as a proprietor,
managing its internal operations, rather than acting as
lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action
will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its
actions as a lawmaker may be subject.  Kokinda, supra, at
___ (plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961)).  Thus, we
have upheld a ban on political advertisements in city-
operated transit vehicles, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U. S. 298 (1974), even though the city permitted other
types of advertising on those vehicles.  Similarly, we have
permitted a school district to limit access to an internal
mail system used to communicate with teachers employed
by the district.  Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37 (1983).
  These cases reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, a
-forum-based- approach for assessing restrictions that the
government seeks to place on the use of its property.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985).  Under this approach,
regulation of speech on government property that has
traditionally been available for public expression is subject
to the highest scrutiny.  Such regulations survive only if
they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest.  Perry, supra, at 45.  The second category of public
property is the designated public forum, whether of a
limited or unlimited character - property that the state
has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the
public.  Ibid.  Regulation of such property is subject to the
same limitations as that governing a traditional public
forum.  Id., at 46.  Finally, there is all remaining public
property.  Limitations on expressive activity conducted on
this last category of property must survive only a much
more limited review.  The challenged regulation need only
be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to
suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with
the speaker's view.  Ibid.
  The parties do not disagree that this is the proper
framework.  Rather, they disagree whether the airport
terminals are public fora or nonpublic fora.  They also
disagree whether the regulation survives the -reasonable-
ness- review governing nonpublic fora, should that prove
the appropriate category.  Like the Court of Appeals, we
conclude that the terminals are nonpublic fora and that the
regulation reasonably limits solicitation.
  The suggestion that the government has a high burden in
justifying speech restrictions relating to traditional public
fora made its first appearance in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516 (1939).
Justice Roberts, concluding that individuals have a right to
use -streets and parks for communication of views,-
reasoned that such a right flowed from the fact that -streets
and parks . . . have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.-  We confirmed
this observation in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481
(1988), where we held that a residential street was a public
forum.
  Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the
characteristics of a public forum.  In Cornelius we noted
that a traditional public forum is property that has as -a
principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas.-  473
U. S., at 800.  Moreover, consistent with the notion that the
government - like other property owners - -has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which
it is lawfully dedicated,- Greer, supra, at 836, the govern-
ment does not create a public forum by inaction.  Nor is a
public forum created -whenever members of the public are
permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the
Government.-  Ibid.  The decision to create a public forum
must instead be made -by intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional forum for public discourse.-  Cornelius, supra, at 802.
Finally, we have recognized that the location of property
also has bearing because separation from acknowledged
public areas may serve to indicate that the separated
property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction.
United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 179-180 (1983).
  These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport
terminals are public fora.  Reflecting the general growth of
the air travel industry, airport terminals have only recently
achieved their contemporary size and character.  See H.V.
Hubbard, M. McClintock, & F.B. Williams, Airports:  Their
Location, Administration and Legal Basis, 8 (1930) (noting
that the United States had only 807 airports in 1930).  But
given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has
made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description
of having -immemorially . . . time out of mind- been held in
the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.
Hague, supra, at 515.  Moreover, even within the rather
short history of air transport, it is only -[i]n recent years
[that] it has become a common practice for various religious
and non-profit organizations to use commercial airports as
a forum for the distribution of literature, the solicitation of
funds, the proselytizing of new members, and other similar
activities.-  45 Fed. Reg. 35314 (1980).  Thus, the tradition
of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have
historically been made available for speech activity.  Nor
can we say that these particular terminals, or airport
terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by
their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing
litigation evidencing the operators' objections belies any
such claim.  See n.2, supra.  In short, there can be no
argument that society's time-tested judgment, expressed
through acquiescence in a continuing practice, has resolved
the issue in petitioner's favor.
  Petitioner attempts to circumvent the history and practice
governing airport activity by pointing our attention to the
variety of speech activity that it claims historically occurred
at various -transportation nodes- such as rail stations, bus
stations, wharves, and Ellis Island.  Even if we were
inclined to accept petitioner's historical account describing
speech activity at these locations, an account respondent
contests, we think that such evidence is of little import for
two reasons.  First, much of the evidence is irrelevant to
public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail
terminals traditionally have had private ownership.  See
United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678, 687 (1982); H.R. Grant & C.W. Bohi, The
Country Railroad Station in America, 11-15 (1978);
United States Dept. of Transportation, The Intercity Bus
Terminal Study 31 (Dec. 1984).  The development of
privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not
change the public fora status of publicly held parks.  But
the reverse is also true.  The practices of privately held
transportation centers do not bear on the government's
regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport.
  Second, the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not
-transportation nodes- generally.  When new methods of
transportation develop, new methods for accommodating
that transportation are also likely to be needed.  And with
each new step, it therefore will be a new inquiry whether
the transportation necessities are compatible with various
kinds of expressive activity.  To make a category of -trans-
portation nodes,- therefore, would unjustifiably elide what
may prove to be critical differences of which we should
rightfully take account.  The -security magnet,- for exam-
ple, is an airport commonplace that lacks a counterpart in
bus terminals and train stations.  And public access to air
terminals is also not infrequently restricted - just last year
the Federal Aviation Administration required airports for
a 4-month period to limit access to areas normally publicly
accessible.  See 14 CFR 107.11(f) (1991) and United States
Dept. of Transportation News Release, Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary for Public Affairs, January 18, 1991.  To
blithely equate airports with other transportation centers,
therefore, would be a mistake.
  The differences among such facilities are unsurprising
since, as the Court of Appeals noted, airports are commer-
cial establishments funded by users fees and designed to
make a regulated profit, 925 F. 2d, at 581, and where
nearly all who visit do so for some travel related purpose.
Id., at 578.  As commercial enterprises, airports must
provide services attractive to the marketplace.  In light of
this, it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as
a principal purpose -promoting the free exchange of ideas.-
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U. S. 788 (1985).  To the contrary, the record
demonstrates that Port Authority management considers
the purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of
passenger air travel, not the promotion of expression.
Sloane Affidavit, -11, 2 App. 464; Defendant's Civil Rule
3(g) Statement, -39, 2 App. 453.  Even if we look beyond
the intent of the Port Authority to the manner in which the
terminals have been operated, the terminals have never
been dedicated (except under the threat of court order)
to expression in the form sought to be exercised here: i.e.,
the solicitation of contributions and the distribution of
literature.
  The terminals here are far from atypical.  Airport
builders and managers focus their efforts on providing
terminals that will contribute to efficient air travel.  See,
e.g., R. Horonjeff & F. McKelvey, Planning and Design of
Airports 326 (3d. ed. 1983)(-[t]he terminal is used to process
passengers and baggage for the interface with aircraft and
the ground transportation modes-).  The Federal Govern-
ment is in accord; the Secretary of Transportation has been
directed to publish a plan for airport development necessary
-to anticipate and meet the needs of civil aeronautics, to
meet requirements of the national defense . . . and to meet
identified needs of the Postal Service.-  49 U. S. C. App.
2203(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also, 45 Fed. Reg. 35317
(1980) (-[t]he purpose for which the [Dulles and National
airport] terminal[s] was built and maintained is to process
and serve air travelers efficiently-).  Although many
airports have expanded their function beyond merely
contributing to efficient air travel, few have included among
their purposes the designation of a forum for solicitation
and distribution activities.  See supra, at 7.  Thus, we think
that neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be
described as satisfying the standards we have previously set
out for identifying a public forum.
  The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only
satisfy a requirement of reasonableness.  We reiterate what
we stated in Kokinda, the restriction ```need only be reason-
able; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reason-
able limitation.'-  496 U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion)
(quoting Cornelius, supra, at 808).  We have no doubt that
under this standard the prohibition on solicitation passes
muster.
  We have on many prior occasions noted the disruptive
effect that solicitation may have on business.  -Solicitation
requires action by those who would respond: The individual
solicited must decide whether or not to contribute (which
itself might involve reading the solicitor's literature or
hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach
for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce
a credit card.-  Kokinda, supra, at ___; see Heffron, 452
U. S., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).  Passengers who wish to avoid the solicitor
may have to alter their path, slowing both themselves and
those around them.  The result is that the normal flow of
traffic is impeded.  Id., at 653.  This is especially so in an
airport, where -air travelers, who are often weighted down
by cumbersome baggage . . . may be hurrying to catch a
plane or to arrange ground transportation.-  925 F. 2d, at
582.  Delays may be particularly costly in this setting, as a
flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours
worth of subsequent inconvenience.
  In addition, face-to-face solicitation presents risks of
duress that are an appropriate target of regulation.  The
skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the most
vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those
suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid
the solicitation.  See, e.g., International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-163
(NDNY 1980), rev'd on other grounds 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2
1981).  The unsavory solicitor can also commit fraud
through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate
efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase.  506 F.
Supp., 159-163.  See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315 (1980).
Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport,
the targets of such activity frequently are on tight sched-
ules.  This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to stop and
formally complain to airport authorities.  As a result, the
airport faces considerable difficulty in achieving its legiti-
mate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure
that travelers are not interfered with unduly.
  The Port Authority has concluded that its interest in
monitoring the activities can best be accomplished by
limiting solicitation and distribution to the sidewalk areas
outside the terminals.  Sloane Supp. Affidavit, -11, 2 App.
514.  This sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming
percentage of airport users, see id., at -14, 2 App. 515-516
(noting that no more than 3% of air travelers passing
through the terminals are doing so on intraterminal flights,
i. e. transferring planes).  Thus the resulting access of those
who would solicit the general public is quite complete.  In
turn we think it would be odd to conclude that the Port
Authority's terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the
Port Authority having otherwise assured access to an area
universally traveled.
  The inconveniences to passengers and the burdens on
Port Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity
may seem small, but viewed against the fact that -pedestri-
an congestion is one of the greatest problems facing the
three terminals,- 925 F. 2d, at 582, the Port Authority could
reasonably worry that even such incremental effects would
prove quite disruptive.  Moreover, -the justification for the
Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would
result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.-
Heffron, supra, at 652.  For if petitioner is given access, so
too must other groups.  -Obviously, there would be a much
larger threat to the State's interest in crowd control if all
other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organiza-
tions could likewise move freely.-  452 U. S., at 653.  As a
result, we conclude that the solicitation ban is reasonable.
  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the ban on solicitation in Port Authority
terminals is
Affirmed.